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INTRODUCTION 
The prototype: more than many and less than one 
 
 
Abstract 
The essay offers an introduction to the special issue, and further attempts to situate the 
concept of the prototype within the larger field of an anthropology of prefiguration. I make 
a particular claim for the rise of ‘prototyping’ as a cultural discourse today, in design, 
engineering and artistic circles, but also among analogous experimental moments in social 
studies of science and critical theory. I focus in particular on the affordances of the 
prototype as material culture and sociological theory: prototyping as something that 
happens to social relationships when one approaches the craft and agency of objects in 
particular ways. Last, the essay examines the work that prototypes do as figures of 
suspension and expectation, where they can be seen to function as ‘traps’ for the emergence 
of compossibility. They offer in this guise a design for contemporary complexity that is at 
once ‘more than many and less than one’. 
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‘Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 
‘proto-phenomenon.’’(Wittgenstein 2009, 654–656) 
 
‘a goat is not a very good pig; the best pig is a cow.’1 
 
Prototypes have acquired much prominence and visibility in recent times. Software 
development is perhaps the case par excellence, where the release of non-stable versions of 
programmes has become commonplace, as is famously in free and open source software 
(Kelty 2008). Developers are here known for releasing beta or work-in-progress versions of 
their programmes, as an invitation or call for others to contribute their own developments 
and closures. An important feature of prototyping in this case is the incorporation of failure 
as a legitimate and very often empirical realisation. 
Prototyping has also become an important currency of explanation and description in 
art-technology contexts, where the emphasis is on the productive and processual aspects of 
experimentation. Medialabs, hacklabs, community and social art collectives, dorkbots, open 
collaborative websites or design thinking workshops are spaces and sites where prototyping 
and experimentation have taken hold as both modes of knowledge-production and cultural 
and sociological styles of exchange and interaction. Common to many such endeavours are: 
user-centred innovation, where users are incorporated into artefacts’ design processes; ICT-
mediated forms of collaboration (email distribution lists, wikispaces, peer-to-peer digital 
channels), or; decentralised and so-called ‘horizontal’ organisational structures. Some 
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economists favour the term ‘open innovation’ to describe an emerging production 
paradigm, where the boundaries between production, distribution and consumption (inside 
and outside an organisation) are increasingly blurred and interpenetrated (Chesbrough 
2005). Computer-aided rapid manufacturing or 3-D printing are for example contributing to 
the collapse of some such categories, say, when a person can customise an artefact’s design 
from her home computer and have it immediately printed out in 3-D. The object’s 
materiality is then rendered ‘propinquitous’ (Buchli 2010), ‘an intangible everyware 
(Greenfield 2006), less of a thing than an event. From a historical and sociological angle, 
the backdrop of such cultures of prototyping is not infrequently connected, if in complex 
and not always obvious ways, with a variety of artistic vanguards, the do-it-yourself, 
environmental and recycling movements, even the development of cybernetic philosophy 
(Turner 2006). 
Experimentation has also been at the centre of recent reassessments of the 
organisation of laboratory, expert and more generally epistemic cultures in the academy. 
An interesting development is the shift in emphasis from the experimental as a knowledge-
site to the experimental as a social process. For example, in open access publishing, or 
more generally in open collaborative scientific exchanges, where sociality and social 
exchange often become the limit-tests of experimentation itself, such as in debates about 
interdisciplinary exchanges (Strathern 2004a). Other examples include the use of social 
media to enable new para-sites of collaboration, where researchers and informants mutually 
co-design and modulate an epistemic space, or, simply, occasions where researchers (for 
example, anthropologists) are drawn into a research problem at the request of their 
informants (say, an international organisation that turns to the anthropologist for advice). 
Where researchers once entered the field as outsiders (academics) they are now suddenly 
and unexpectedly being turned into insiders (colleagues, advisors). The traditional entry 
and exit points of knowledge-creation now face a permanent threat of abduction and 
destabilisation (Mosse 2006).  
In art, design, science, even entrepreneurial and political organisation, the languages 
of openness and open-endedness, of provisionality and experimentation, are thus taking 
hold as models for cultural practice. The prototype works as descriptor for both an 
epistemic object and an epistemic culture (Knorr-Cetina 1999). It is a language of, and 
reference for, a new techno-political consciousness of craft, skill and communal self-
organisation. The experimental and open-ended qualities of prototyping have become a 
surrogate for new cultural experiences and processes of democratisation. 
In an age of audit justifications, social impact and public and ethical accountabilities, 
the seductiveness of the prototype is hard not to miss. Here is an epistemic culture built on 
collaboration, provisionality, recycling, experimentation and creativity, which seems as 
much oriented to the production of technological artefacts as it is to the social engineering 
of hope. If the culture of prototyping indeed prototypes hope, shouldn’t we all hope for 
prototyping cultures more generally? 
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takes the prototype seriously as a social form; it is slightly more daunting to have such a 
form prefigure our cultural moment. Ours is the time, so it seems, that makes both possible.   
The prototype offers in this sense a privileged vantage point from where to critically 
examine some of the key debates in social theory today. Thus, the artefactual and object-
orientation of prototyping feeds directly into recent discussions about the materiality of 
political process (Marres and Lezaun 2011). The intrinsic futurity of the prototype 
addresses too some crucial questions about the hopefulness and promise of critical and 
collaborative work. Prototypes are also inscriptive objects in their own right: objects that 
hold within various biographical, techno-scientific and cultural lines of flight. They are 
‘things that talk’ (Daston 2007), and that in this capacity can contribute much to present 
discussions about the objectual and material qualities of culture. Last, the prototype’s 
porosity, indefiniteness and epistemic interdisciplinarity as a ‘boundary object’ offers new 
materials with which to think the place of models and model-building in science, art and 
cultural production at large (Creager, Lunbeck, and Wise 2007; Manchanda 2006; 
Chadarevian and Hopwood 2004). It offers, in particular, another route for reappraising the 
status of ‘things-that-are-not-quite-objects-yet’ as modelling devices in their own right. 
Prototyping Cultures examines the claims, affordances and purchase of the prototype 
in a number of social and historical contexts. The history of science, as well as 
anthropological studies of innovation and technology, can help us situate the rise of the 
prototyping paradigm in a useful comparative framework, appraising both its (alleged) 
political promises and sociological justice, but also its critical value. The technological 
promises of the prototype seem to have instated a new illusion of democracy: it has brought 
the worlds of objects, engineering, design, cultural practice and politics together in some 
new fertile assemblages. It is therefore high time for social theory to take the prototype to 
task as both an epistemic object and a critical tool. 
In the rest of this Introduction I shall make a particular claim for the rise of 
‘prototyping’ as a cultural discourse today. My interest is in the affordances of the 
prototype as material culture and sociological theory: prototyping as something that 
happens to social relationships when one approaches the craft and agency of objects in 
particular ways. A cultural moment, then, when the prototype stands for the mutual 
prefiguration of objects and sociality; when objects and social relationships are recursively 
parenthesised, now as protos, now as types, with respect to each other. In this mutual 
bracketing, prototyping appears as a figure of possibility and suspension where 
relationships and objects can be at once ‘more than many and less than one’. 
 
The Barber Shop 
In 1968 Gerhard Nonmemacher, a Chicago barber, battled with the city’s Public Building 
Commission over copyright issues concerning the reproduction of Pablo Picasso’s 
monumental sculpture at Daley Plaza. The construction of the sculpture had been 
undertaken by the Commission following the original design of a maquette by the artist. On 
21 August 1966 Picasso signed a ‘deed of gift’ whereby he donated the maquette to the Art 
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Institute of Chicago, and the sculpture, and the right to reproduce it, to the Public Building 
Commission, ‘desiring that these gifts shall, through them, belong to the people of 
Chicago.’ (Anon.) The Commission and the City of Chicago undertook then a successful 
publicity campaign where drawings and photographs of the maquette were widely 
displayed and exhibited to advertise the Chicago Picasso. 
The campaign’s success prompted Nonmemacher to market a copy of the sculpture as 
his own business logo. The ensuing case battle went down in history as ‘The Letter Edged 
in Black Press, Inc. (Plaintiff), v. Public Building Commission of Chicago, a municipal 
corporation (Defendant)’. The defendant’s legal argumentation rested on an attempt to draw 
a distinction between copyright invested in the maquette and that of the public sculpture. 
‘The defendant’s basic contention’, as District Judge Napoli put it, ‘is that the work of art is 
the properly copyrighted monumental sculpture not the models.’ The judge, however, 
thought otherwise, and sentenced that when ‘the monumental sculpture was finally 
completed it could not be copyrighted for it was a mere copy, albeit on a grand scale, of the 
maquette, a work already in the public domain.’ (Anon.) The Commission’s very use of the 
maquette in its publicity campaign had already divested the piece of any copyright 
entitlements. The drawings and photographs that the Commission had strenuously divulged 
to promote the ‘Chicago Picasso’ had effectively relocated the art piece into the public 
domain. Through the marketing campaign the city had literally ‘owned up’ to the sculpture. 
The Barber’s Shop would only two years later become an art piece itself, when 
William Copley assembled a portfolio of photographs, press clippings and copies of the 
exhibits attached to the Letter Edged legal opinion. Copley was at the time producing a 
series of editioned sets that were mailed directly to subscribers in an exercise meant to 
upend the traditional art gallery system. He curated six portfolios in all (known as S.M.S., 
Shit Must Stop), including sets with pieces by Man Ray, Marcel Duchamp or John Cage. 
His own portfolio on The Barber Shop, as Catharina Manchanda has noted, is ‘a hilarious 
exercise in the question of original, copy, and commerce’, where Copley ‘suggests that 
Picasso’s three-dimensional model (an image of which Copley included in his piece) was in 
fact a prototype, the finished sculpture and all subsequent commercial adaptations copies of 
varying degrees.’ (Manchanda 2006, 39–42) 
The image of the prototype, as deployed by Manchanda and Copley, captures 
beautifully the tensions that inhere in the production of late twentieth century forms of 
(artistic) knowledge: a figure whose contours are always already temporally stretched and 
spatially blurred. The Barber’s Shop set explicitated the prototypical qualities of Picasso’s 
artwork by revealing its retention and protention in a complex web of relations, including 
for example a copy of the letter that Nonmemacher addressed to Picasso, press clippings of 
the affair, or a copyrighted photograph of the sculpture. Copley’s art set prototypes the 
prototype that inhered in Picasso’s. 
Copley’s use of multiples and readymades participates of a wider shift in late 
twentieth century art aimed at modelling the processes of artistic practice itself. It was an 
attempt to dislocate and disassemble the figure of the author and shift attention to relations, 
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objects and functions rarely if ever associated with artistic craftsmanship. The set embodied 
what Howard Becker has called the ‘Principle of the Fundamental Indeterminacy of the 
Artwork’: the impossibility for ‘anyone to speak of the “work itself” because there is no 
such thing. There are only the many occasions on which a work appears or is performed or 
read or viewed, each of which can be different from all the others.’ (Becker 2006, 22–23)  
In doing so, it essayed a dismantling of the institutional economy of art, questioning the 
proprietary status of artworks, their political remit, civic personifications, even their 
communicative capacities (travelling in postal service). It disassembled the object into 
multiple potentialities. As Susanne Küchler has put it, ‘prototypical artwork [can be seen] 
as prefiguring a knowledge-based economy, which thrives on the circulation of images 
rather than objects.’ (Küchler 2010, 301–302)2 
Although I do not intend to claim for the Barber Shop a historical antecedence to the 
forms of socio-technical, artistic and political experimentation that may fall under the 
rubric of ‘prototyping cultures’, I do think that Copley’s intervention prefigures some of 
the cultural assemblages for which the imago of the prototype seems to stand today. Indeed, 
‘prefiguration’ itself fares as one such cultural form. As we shall see below, a salient 
feature of prototyping is that it is internally pre-figured: what the prototype ‘prototypes’, 
first and foremost, is its own re-appearance as prototype, its own recursion. Yet the quality 
of prefiguration is not exclusive to the prototype. Prefiguration is a quality often found in – 
some have argued (e.g. Wagner 1986), constitutive of  – symbolic anthropology, or indeed 
a feature of relationality itself (Strathern 2004b, 79, 98). In what follows I offer a review of 
some features of the contemporary culture of prototyping. I am less interested in situating 
today’s ‘prototype’ in cultural or historical perspective, however, than in throwing light on 
the current perception of the prototype as a figure of sociological promise and abeyance. 
The prototype, I shall argue, is a ‘trap’ for a contemporary figure of possibility and 
expectation. The work of such a trap is to keep sociality in suspension. The perception of 
suspension is elicited itself by ‘the prototype’ as a material but also as a social form. 
Sometimes it is sociality that drives the ‘proto’ with respect to the material ‘type’; 
sometimes it is the artefactual that ‘speeds up’ against an apparently still and dormant 
background of social expectations. Prototyping is what a perception of liberated and self-
released social relationships may do to and through the material world; it is also what a 
conception of a material world ‘in beta’ does to social relationships. The artefact is 
prefigured in prototyping as social process; the object as transitive materiality is elicited by 
a conception of social relationships as transiently experimental. 
My argument here, then, is that prototyping works as a cultural heuristic, in ways not 
unlike how (say) ‘comparison’ or ‘compatibility’ have at different points in time provided 
aesthetic and critical purchase to the function of social analysis3. Prototyping is its own 
form of analysis, one, moreover, that places analysis itself ‘in beta’. In this sense, 
prototyping works to produce scenarios not so much of comparison or compatibility as of 
compossibility. Whereas comparison presumes scale, and comparability requires partiality, 
compossibility supplements these by operating within and promoting a field of suspension, 
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one that facilitates a proliferation of abductions and transformations, including the 
possibility of (virtuous) failure. Herein lies, again, the ‘trap’ of the prototype: failure 
(recursively) prototyped. 
The intrinsic recursion of the prototype weighs in, then, to shape its ‘infinition’ as a 
cultural form (Holbraad 2012). If the complex of social analysis was once required to 
produce descriptions whose effects were ‘more than one and less than many’ (Mol and Law 
2002), the prototype indexes a cultural form in turn that is ‘more than many and less than 
one’4: always on the move and proliferating into affinal objects, yet never quite 
accomplishing its own closure. 
 
Experimentation 
Experiments have a distinguished genealogy in the history and practice of the sciences 
(Shapin and Schaffer 1985). The history of experimentation has traditionally been carried 
out at specific sites and in the name of specific and trusted communities of practitioners and 
witnesses. The experiment has likewise mobilized a cohort of instrumental functions, 
objects, bodies and passions (including the desiring body of the experimentalist him – and 
less often her-self; see Schaffer 1998). The triangulation of experimentalist, experimental 
setting and the things experimented upon has at different points in history framed different 
notions of subject, object, facts, nature, and objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007). It is 
also worth distinguishing between the ‘experiment’ and the ‘experimental system’: if the 
experiment was once thought-of as a closed system against which scientists sought a 
theory’s justification, it would seem that today the experimental is conceived rather as a 
design project, ‘an experimental arrangement designed’, as Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has put 
it, ‘to produce knowledge that is not yet at our disposal.’ (1997, 27) The very designing of 
the arrangement exemplifies the extent to which the research process and its techno-
material means of deliverance are inextricably connected. The fact that the layout of the 
arrangement may incorporate objects that lay outside the laboratory’s walls has led to 
thinking of experiments as scale-shifting devices, capable of rendering the world 
‘proportionate’ to new onto-epistemic frameworks. The laboratory suddenly becomes 
commensurable (flattened) to the world outside: the inside and the outside are levelled and 
re-balanced vis-à-vis each other by the experimental design (Latour 1983). Thus conceived, 
the distributed layout of an experimental design deploys new ‘divisions of labour’ (between 
objects, techniques, networks and actors), or perhaps we should heed Hayek’s insistence 
here and speak instead of a new ‘division of knowledge’ (Hayek 1937, 49). For the 
‘empirical’ can hardly be conceived any longer as a data set confined to the activities of 
academic or scientific expropriation (Savage and Burrows 2007). 
Thus, where the laboratory was once imagined in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
experimental philosophy as an organisational space for ‘torturing’ or ‘distorting’ nature 
(elaborating on the facts of nature), the prototype, as the figure for contemporary forms of 
experimental collaboration, weighs in on the elaboration of social relationships instead. 
Relationships, epistemic things and experimental practices are entangled in their on-going 
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rearrangement as prototyping cultures. They materialize their own social and political 
designs. What the 1970s arguably witnessed, following Galison and Jones (1999), was a 
displacement in the location of the experimental from ‘knowledge-site’ to ‘knowledge-
process’; a shift in the understanding of experimentation as a ‘collective’ rather than 
‘collected’ enterprise (Latour 2011). There is perhaps no better example of this 
displacement that the rise of what Noortje Marres has called ‘experiments in living’: where 
the experimental is no longer a domain of activity but a repertoire of techniques (Marres 
2012) – and today all kinds of people are prone to learn and deploy such techniques over 
matters that are ‘vital’ to them. The experimental has literally gone ‘live’. 
Prototyping cultures, then, share many of the epistemic and organisational features of 
‘experimental systems’. However, the rise of the language and imaginary of prototyping 
amongst new media, art and design, or digital social movements signals to one important 
distinction. Whereas the open-endedness and haziness of the experimental is oriented 
towards the production of epistemic things, the work of prototyping employs such open-
endedness to deliberate political effect. Thus, whilst the experimental and the prototypical 
both invest in their residence in a space of uncertainty, they do so with varying intent. The 
experimental, following Rheinberger, is set up ‘for the continuous reemergence of 
unexpected events’ (1997, 32–33, emphasis added), whilst the prototypical aims instead for 
underdetermined events – events that summon their own openness to future tinkering. 
Chris Kelty, in his study of Free Software speaks thus of ‘culture [as] an ongoing 
experimental system, a space of modification and modulation, of figuring out and testing; 
culture is an experiment that is hard to keep an eye on, one that changes quickly and 
sometimes starkly.’ (Kelty 2008, 15, emphasis removed) In this context, Free Software 
itself fares as a ‘collective technical experimental system’ (Kelty 2008, 2; see also Fischer 
2009). Likewise, Bruce Braun and Sarah Whatmore have recently drawn attention to the 
‘redirection of research energies and resources toward more constructive partnerships in the 
staging and practice of experimental knowledge polities in terms of the fora, media, and 
devices in and through which technoscientific objects are rendered affective and amenable 
to effective political interrogation.’ (Braun and Whatmore 2010, xxvii, emphasis added) 
‘Experiments’, Latour has said, ‘are now taking place on a life-size scale and in real time… 
[they are] happening to us, through the action of each of us’ (Latour 2003, 32). 
Despite this proliferation of the ‘experimental’ as an intellectual-cum-political modus 
operandi, it is nonetheless surprising how poor the social sciences’ own record has been in 
experimenting with their means of production and performance. The point is brought home 
by George Marcus in his essay in this volume. Marcus compares two modalities of 
experimentation in anthropological (and I would argue, social scientific) research: Type 1 
Prototyping, where the vocation of experimentation has been confined to questions of 
method and literary technique; and Type 2 Prototyping, for which the academy has no 
serious record to this day, and which would require experimenting with the production of 
new formats and devices for collective thinking – in other words, which calls for the 
‘prototyping’ of novel techniques for collaborative research, emulating perhaps the 
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strategies of critical design and critical making (Ratto 2011), laying out an experimental 
field where tools, objects, spaces and forms of encounter are all devised anew. 
The call for the social sciences to prototype new devices for collective thought draws 
attention to an important shift in the constitution of our epistemic worlds. If the task of the 
social sciences was once thought to be that of clearing new pathways to reason, it seems 
that today they are engaged (or there are calls for their engagement) in an inventive 
proliferation and deployment of object-knowledges. Thus, whereas the social form of the 
experimental in scientific environments once aimed for epistemology, it is perhaps fit to 
describe the rise of the social form of the prototype as an ontological procedure, a political 
design whereby the prototype is bodied forth as a new object-assemblage in the world. If 
the epistemic pulls the experimental, it is the ware (the arranging of the equipment) that 
holds sway in the prototypical. 
 
Recursion, prefigured 
Arranging equipment in space and time may be thought of as a choreography of sorts. 
Copley’s Barber Shop was certainly a choreographic composition, moving through time 
and space in a fragile equilibrium of objects, exchanges and images. James Leach, in his 
essay in this volume, describes a contemporary dance company’s use of digital media to 
create novel forms of engagement with its audiences as an experiment, too, in the making 
of new choreographic objects and relations. The choreographic echoes here John Tresch’s 
notion of the ‘cosmogram’ (2007) or Rheinberger’s image of ‘graphematic concatenations’ 
(1997, 105–108). These are idioms that aim to describe the material and semiotic topology 
brought into being through the traces and marks left by the relational engagements of 
human and non-human persons – descriptions of techno-material world-diagrams. 
An important element of the prototype’s choreographic and diagrammatic layout is its 
procedural openness. In Leach’s example, the choreographic is rehearsed vis-à-vis the 
dance company’s audience. The prototype’s experimental design is left open for ‘the 
public’ to interact or tinker with – a boundary object tensed by a repertoire of potential uses 
and inclinations. Indeed, as Michael Guggenheim notes in his essay in this volume, perhaps 
the history of prototyping should be better contextualized as a history of ‘allotyping’, a 
history of changes of use. Lucy Suchman and her colleagues, however, are more interested 
in the prototype’s capacity to reconfigure a work practice through the simultaneous 
reconfiguration of its network of ‘accountabilities’, which may include users or 
professional communities but also non-human actors. Not where the prototype as object can 
go, but where and how its community of developers comes together around it as they 
simultaneously re-evaluate and reshape their own practice: ‘an object that reconfigured 
material and discursive practice in an accountably relevant way.’ Such collaborative 
reconfigurations they call ‘co-operative prototyping’ (Suchman, Trigg, and Blomberg 2002, 
175, 167). 
There is perhaps no better example of co-operative prototyping today than Free 
Software. Free Software projects are always everywhere infrastructurally underdetermined 
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by the community of people at work on it at any given point in time. The community of 
developers is ‘self-grounded’, as Chris Kelty puts it, in its own infra/structural constitution. 
Such entanglement is infra/structural because it is continuously questioning, challenging 
and reorienting the ‘depth or strata of this self-grounding: the layers of technical and legal 
infrastructure’ which are necessary for the community to exist in the first place (Kelty 
2008, 8). 
Developers who are collaborating on a Free Software project come therefore together 
in what Kelty calls a ‘recursive public’, where the ‘recursion’ refers to this capacity to self-
ground one’s own politico-technical desires: where the project is simultaneously written as 
output and rewritten as infrastructure. What arguably distinguishes Free Software as 
prototype is its aesthetic and desideratum as a politico-technical object: its self-image as a 
social collective in the very terms of the prototype. 
Of experimental systems at large Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has observed that to 
‘establish a scientific object means that it will have emerged from differential reproduction 
and that it will be able to be inserted in the reproductive cycle of an experimental system. 
Epistemic things, therefore, are recursively constituted and thus intrinsically historical 
things.’ (1997, 76, emphasis added) The work of prototyping, then, diagrammatizes its own 
field of sustainable open action. If John Tresch speaks of ‘cosmograms’ as ‘external 
depictions of the elements of the cosmos and the connections among them’, yet ones which 
insofar as presenting ‘a totality… remain firmly within the local and the empirical’ and 
therefore ‘raise the possibility of an open holism’ (Tresch 2007, 92, 93), perhaps it makes 
sense to speak of prototypes in this context as betagrams, that is, as symbolic 
infrastructures for a holism ‘in beta’. 
The ‘Dinosaur’ that Adolfo Estalella, the members of the Zoohaus collective and 
myself describe in our essay offers an evocative example of the making of one such 
betagrammatic infrastructure. During its life course, the Dinosaur-object underwent 
unexpected transformations, from its original status as a repository of diagrammatic and 
technical specifications, to its later development into an archive, a neighbourhood office, 
and finally a curatorial project aimed at producing ‘events’ or ‘situations’. The situations 
deployed an unanticipated quality of the Dinosaur’s betagrammatic properties: its 
ontological nature as an ‘atmosphere’. It is in this guise, too, that the Dinosaur became, in 
the words of the art collective, ‘a prototype for an open-source architecture’. The Dinosaur 
thus grew by re-functionalising its own infrastructural capacities, as it struggled to keep its 
various components (diagrams, digital media, wood planks, people) in a beta or open status. 
In the words of the members of the Zoohaus collective, the history of the Dinosaur is 
in many respects the story of its re-functionalization from ‘open knowledge’ to ‘eventful 
infrastructure’. Alex Wilkie’s ethnography of the design of a technological prototype for 
the management of obesity likewise centres on the figure of ‘event’ as conceptual 
placeholder for understanding the multiple user-technology concrescences through which 
‘obesity’ is continually redefined as a techno- and bio-political issue. The prototype whose 
history Wilkie describes works in this fashion as a sort of operator of ‘becomings’: the 
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prototype ‘aims’ for obesity, which thence remains ‘not-quite-the-thing-yet’. As Wilkie 
puts it, this also opens up the performativity of prototyping to the allure of a sociology of 
expectations. 
This capacity of the prototype to call upon itself, to re-functionalise its own purpose, 
recalls Roy Wagner’s analysis of myth and trope as a ‘symbol that stands for itself’ (1986). 
One of the ethnographies that Wagner builds his analytical model on is Nancy Munn’s 
splendid account of iconographic representation among the Walbiri people of central 
Australia (Munn 1973). Munn describes the power of Walbiri iconographs (in particular 
‘tracks’ traced in sand) to re-inscribe a person’s life-trails and displacements within the 
cosmological impressions made in the earth by the creative original movements of ancestral 
beings. ‘The life of a person’, glosses Wagner, ‘is the sum of his tracks, the total inscription 
of his movements, something that can be traced out along the ground. And the life course 
of a people, the totality of their ways, conventions, and conventionally encountered 
situations, is the sum of its “tracks,” the trails over its country along which experience is 
measured out.’ (Wagner 1986, 21) 
The iconography of the track summons and reproduces the creative designs of 
ancestral beings through the creativity and inventiveness of the Walbiri people themselves. 
The ‘meaning’ of iconographs does not lie ‘before’ them (in the myths of origin) or ‘after’ 
them (in their narratological representations), but in their very tracing and tracking as ‘self-
grounding’ (in Kelty’s sense) conditions of life. The graph may be seen therefore as a 
recursive performance. Thus, not unlike ‘graphemes’ or ‘cosmograms’ these designs are 
(graphic) interventions in the epistemic- and ontological conditions of Walbiri life. Indeed, 
Rheinberger too has described the movement of experimental work as a ‘tracing game’ 
(1997, 21) 
The recursion of tracing partakes therefore of a wider anthropology of prefiguration. 
Walbiri graphs and songs and stories and dreamings and the designs in bodily decorations 
may be seen as analogies on analogies. Relations are always turning themselves ‘into’ other 
relations, moving in and out of different social forms, in what Roy Wagner has described as 
a ‘flow of analogies’ (1977). Such flow is ‘obviational’, for it makes ‘obvious’ the 
supplementary and substitutive flow of social relations, but in that very movement some 
relations are also ‘obviated’ in favour of others (Wagner 1978, 31). As a social dialectic, 
pre-figuration or obviation is ‘the process by which the artificial comes to metaphorize the 
innate (and the reverse process).’ (Wagner 1978, 31) Pre-figuration works therefore as the 
recursive logic through which social process recurrently artificializes and ‘artefactualizes’ 
itself, a point to which I shall return below. 
Within the larger purview of the anthropology of prefiguration, the prototype fares as 
a pure (perhaps the paradigmatic) analogical figure: the cultural form capable of pre-
figuring its inherent transformative and inventive dynamic. Martin Holbraad has said that 
as an anthropological analytic, ‘recursion’ operates a form of empirical truth on social 
relationships that evinces in their ‘infinition’ (Holbraad 2012, 220), their re-inventive 
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definition of themselves. The prototype is infinitive in this tropic sense too. It dwells in its 
own culture of (self-) elicitation. 
 
Traps 
The prototype, so it seems, is but the artefact that ‘moves’ by itself: open-ended, self-
elicitating, recursive. Indeed, Holbraad, in describing the heuristics of a ‘recursive 
anthropology’, turns precisely to such an image of self-motion: ‘What we have, in effect, is 
a machine for thinking in perpetual motion – an excessive motion’ (Holbraad 2012, 265). 
Prototypes echo or rehearse in this context the larger history of ‘devices of wonder’ 
(Stafford and Terpak 2001), instruments and artefacts that entrap our conceptions of 
personhood and social relationality within the enchantment of apparently magical 
technologies of production. Devices of wonder, such as the Enlightenment’s fascination 
with game-playing automata (Schaffer 1999), trapped their audiences in the illusions of 
self-movement. ‘We in the west’, Alfred Gell once observed, ‘have longed for (and 
fantasized about) statues or images that would move, or bless, or make love, but, for 
centuries, always in vain.’ (Gell 1999, 209) Gell’s deservedly famous anthropological 
theory of art sought to elucidate the mechanics of such illusion within a complex social 
geography of intentionalities (Gell 1998). Duchamp’s readymades, he observed, do not 
differ in this respect from, say, hunter-gatherers’ traps. They both index forms of surrogate 
agency and models of relations-in-the-world. A trap, noted Gell, 
 
is a model as well as an implement… [It] is particularly a model of its creator, 
because it has to substitute for him; a surrogate hunter, it does its owner’s hunting for 
him. It is, in fact, an automaton or robot, whose design epitomizes the design of its 
maker… This is not just a model of a person… but a ‘working’ model of a person. 
(Gell 1999, 200) 
 
But traps do not just model their creators; they model their addressees too. Hunters 
manufacture traps to emulate a prey’s environs. ‘Traps are lethal parodies of the animal’s 
Umwelt’, says Gell (Gell 1999, 201). Not surprisingly, Rheinberger resorts to the trap 
metaphor too when speaking of the implicit rules of experimentation. ‘They constitute’, he 
says, ‘a kind of experimental spider’s web: the web must be meshed in such a way that 
unknown and unexpected prey is likely to be caught. The web must “see” what the spider 
actually is unable to foresee with its unaided senses.’ (1997, 78) The trap models thus the 
very transitive relation between predator and prey: between the ‘empty time of waiting’ and 
the ‘catastrophe that ensues as the trap closes’ (Gell 1999, 202), the trap holds the 
relationship between predator and prey in abeyance. Between the ‘proto’ and the ‘type’ the 
trap embodies all relationality as a prototype itself. The trap works therefore to 
‘artefactualize’ the illusions of self-movement: it opens up a space and time where the 
mechanics of regularity and predictability and the eventfulness of the unknown are folded 
and kept in mutual suspension. 
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Abduction 
We may also think of the trap’s temporal structure of suspension as a capacity for 
abduction. Gell himself, following Umberto Eco and Charles Pierce, resorts in later work to 
the logical term ‘abduction’ to describe a particular type of semiotic inference (Gell 1998, 
14). Abduction is different from induction or deduction and describes how an entity 
extracts meaning from the vicinity of social relationships wherein it is located. Set amidst a 
nexus of social relations, Gell argues, objects are every now and then mobilized to social 
effect themselves. The moment of abduction is a cognitive and indexical process whereby a 
sign is suddenly thrust into a person’s network of distributed meanings. 
Elsewhere I have suggested that Gell’s model of abduction may be used to 
understand not only how artefacts or signs ‘occupy’ meaning, but how meaning may be 
similarly produced through processes of evacuation or disappearance (Corsín Jiménez 
2008, 237–239): where abduction signals not an effect of agency but agency by omission. 
We can think of persons falling into a trap but also of a trap abducting our personhood – in 
the process making part of ourselves disappear. Thus the tension that inheres in a trap may 
be thought of as being oriented towards the evacuation of expectations, motivations and 
desires from those who inhabit or roam the trap’s vicinity. Indeed, when the trap closes it 
suddenly ‘interrupts’ – gets a hold over – different parts of the hunter’s and game’s 
personhood: whilst the former must redeploy his or her predatory equipment, the latter 
must reawaken its survival instincts. 
This is of course simply another way of saying that social agency is made up of 
actions and subtractions – even distractions, for it is the distracted game that falls into the 
trap. The trap abducts the absent-minded. As a model of relational engagement – as a 
prototype – the trap therefore displays a complex repertoire of modalities of social agency, 
including action, subtraction and distraction. These are enabled by the trap’s emplacement 
in a field of temporal suspension. The trap is capable of eliciting abduction because it is 
deliberately fabricated to ‘hang’ in a regime of uncertainty: it is a temporal construction 
that tolerates uncertainty as a reasonable and feasible outcome. We can invoke 
Wittgenstein’s epigram, with which this essay opens, and say that as a prototype the trap is 
an artefact designed to slow down social life to a proto-phenomenal current. 
 
Slowing down: less than one 
Traps do have a tendency to slow down the flow of life, at least for those who fall into 
them. Think of being trapped inside a broken elevator. Our intentions come to a halt and 
our relationship with the artefact comes into full view. We feel a bit like idiots. Isabelle 
Stengers has recently argued, in fact, for a conception of political life as a trap of sorts, an 
‘artefactualization’ of life for idiots. The idiot, she says, ‘is the one who always slows the 
others down, who resists the consensual way in which the situation is presented and in 
which emergencies mobilize thought or action.’ (Stengers 2005, 1001, 994, emphasis 
added) The broken elevator interrupts indeed consensual expectations. Such a scenario, 
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then, ‘compels everyone to produce, to “artifactualize” themselves, in a mode which gives 
the issue around which they are all gathered the power to activate thinking, a thinking that 
belongs to no one, in which no one is right.’ (Stengers 2005, 1001) The elevator, the trap, 
thinks for us. 
Javier Lezaun and Nerea Calvillo’s essay in this volume offers an account of one 
such artefactualization of the political as the designing of an environmental trap of sorts. 
Lezaun and Calvillo reconstruct Kurt Lewin’s famous experiments on ‘political 
atmospheres’ at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station. Their account brings to the fore 
that which Lewin and his team never quite paid attention to: the materiality of the attic 
space where the experiments were conducted. As Lezaun and Calvillo show, the layout and 
organisation of the attic’s material fabric, apparel and paraphernalia literally furnished and 
imbued the space with atmospheric tension. Thus, the forms of social interaction that Lewin 
dubbed ‘democratic’, ‘autocratic’ or ‘laissez-faire’ were in fact partial re-inscriptions of the 
attic’s infrastructural and spatial equipment. The experimenters furnished the attic space 
such that it would alternately elicit ‘the right political affects’, as Lezaun and Calvillo put 
it, ‘for that is what was meant by ‘atmosphere’.’ They therefore designed a trap where the 
constant locomotion and kinetic dynamic of the group were ‘[c]onceived as a mechanism 
for generating and holding in suspension pure political forms’. The trap’s modulation and 
modelling of an Umwelt enabled ‘the political’ to be held in suspension as an aesthetic 
effect. 
In these terms the trap may appear an omnipotent artefact: a residential unit for all-
encompassing modalities and temporalities of action. I insist, then, in circumscribing such 
features to the trap’s prototypical attributes. Traps serve different purposes in different 
ways. But as prototypes they carry within the memory (so to speak) of proto-phenomenal 
possibilities. We are likely to remember the day we got stuck in an elevator for years to 
come. The elevator encloses us in our impatience, in our own infinition. Let me expand 
with a classic ethnographic example. 
The New Ireland Malangan is a memorial carving commissioned on the occasion of a 
funerary ritual (Küchler 1988). The making of a Malangan sculpture is a process invested 
in the holding together of particular kinds of social relationships, evinced in the motifs and 
designs of the land-occupying matrilineal units that come together at a mortuary ceremony. 
The Malangan figure ‘holds’ these images in place until the ceremony is over, when the gift 
of money for the making of the effigy ‘kills’ the ritual sculpture. The imagery then gets 
detached from the sculpture when it is left to rot, thereby releasing its ‘smell’ (musung), 
which is the most important aspect of memory (Küchler 1988, 627). Thereafter the images 
remain ‘alive’ only in the memories of those who have assisted to the ceremony, who have 
in turn acquired the right to reproduce such images in future ceremonies. 
The Malangan is designed as a container for the channelling of life-force (noman). 
The purpose of the effigy is to recapture (to trap) the life-force released through the 
decomposition of the person’s body. ‘This is’, Alfred Gell has remarked, ‘what the 
Malangan is; a kind of body which accumulates, like a charged battery, the potential energy 
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of the deceased dispersed in the life-world.’ (Gell 1998, 225) Indeed the very making of the 
Malangan rehearses this notion of recharging, for the ritual work that goes into the 
production of the effigy is known as ‘building up the fire’ (Küchler 1988, 631). At the 
ritual presentation of the sculpture, when the effigy comes alive and looks back to the 
people viewing it, the Malangan, in full fire, finally glows with the heat of noman, which is 
then dramatically reclaimed by the attendants.  
The patterns that cover the sculpture’s planes are known as its ‘skin’, a term that in 
New Ireland stands also for affinal relations: those who share the memory of the Malangan 
imagery ‘call themselves “one skin” and can make claims to land and to residency 
irrespective of marriage or birth.’ (Küchler 1988, 632) The assembling and disassembling 
of the Malangan’s skin (the ritual de/composition of the deceased’s body, but also of the 
ritual confederation of ‘one skin’) therefore at once constitutes and traverses the 
spatiotemporal conditions for the circulation of memory. It centripetalises and redistributes 
the memories of dispersed peoples. The Malangan is revealed then as the ‘ideal form’ for a 
‘regional system of socially distributed memory images.’ (Gell 1998, 228) The Malangan, 
then, is not so much an effigy operating as a prototype for modes of social action and 
remembrance, as memory itself circulating as a trap for past/proto and future/type events. 
The Malangan’s internal temporality (building up fire) and external cyclical structure 
(reproducing the relational memories of ‘one skin’) evinces therefore a structural cultural 
form that is always everywhere less than itself: aiming for its own completion it barely 
accomplishes to spark a remembrance for a future iteration. It is performative of its own 
compossibility. 
 
Speeding up: more than many 
The Malangan’s capacity to capture or ‘slow down’ the circulation of memory into 
abductive containers – a capacity to trap and carry, in the terms sketched above, the 
memory of proto-phenomenal relationships – is something often remarked upon in 
prototyping projects in art, media and engineering contexts. A phrase one often hears in 
such projects is, ‘We are getting ahead of ourselves’, when the work of prototyping is 
experienced as releasing alternating currents of excitement and frustration; moments of 
liberation followed by disciplinary calls to hold back, to contain oneself. Not unlike in the 
Malangan case, participation in the making of a prototype levers moments of energetic 
assembly and disassembly. The fire is built up only to let it go again. 
Release and containment appear therefore cultural concomitants of the practice of 
prototyping. In this sense the prototype’s futurity carries within, also, a momentum of 
impetus. The impetus often leads to ‘forking’ scenarios, where excitement and caution 
eventually provoke the project bifurcating in different directions. In Free Software, for 
example, forking takes place when geeks work on particular pieces of source code that at 
one point may add up to a distinctive collection of code. The new code is a rewrite of the 
base source code. The functions and processes that it performs are the same, but the means 
are different. Free Software thus objectifies a culture of internal divisions that may lead to 
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differential extensions and end-up in bifurcations (Kelty 2008, 136–141). The license of 
binary code is pre-empted by the cultural code of binary licensing (cf. Strathern 2011). 
Such detachments are not experienced as necessarily destructive but an expression of 
the conditions of possibility of the prototype itself. The parts or side-projects detached keep 
the proto/type in view. They ‘speed up’ against a background of things that are left behind. 
The detachments are self-proliferating, branching out in unsuspected directions. They do 
not quite amount to an efflorescence of ‘many’, for it is to the conditions of their possibility 
that they keep referring back to. They are many indeed, but their infrastructural recursion 
will certainly open the door for many more to come. They are therefore many ‘more than 
many’: a structural compossibility of the prototype form itself. 
Forking thus makes the prototype itself always appear in ‘proto’ mode against or 
towards a ‘type’ finality. Sometimes it is the capacities that inhere in the artefact that call 
for its acceleration; sometimes it is the energy of social relationships that refresh the 
project’s motion. As Marilyn Strathern has observed, ‘where cutting [forking] is a creative 
act, it displays the internal capacities of persons and the external power of relationships. 
Thus, in these capacities or powers, sociality in turn appears to ‘move’ like a figure against 
a background of persons and relationships.’ (Strathern 2004b, 114) In prototyping what 
‘moves’ is always the prototype itself. In motion and in beta, prototypes therefore work as 
‘arguments’ or theoretical interventions in their own right: where the prototype recurrently 
draws attention to its hermeneutical im/materiality (Galey and Ruecker 2010)5. Prototypes 
call themselves out as they self-ground their motion. Might we build on this notion to intuit 
perhaps in the culture of prototyping a novel mythological form?6 
 
Prototyping cultures: automatas, interfaces, prototypes 
In 1741, Jacques de Vaucanson, who was famous in his time for having fabricated three 
automata, including a duck that could digest and defecate, was commissioned by the French 
government to examine best practices in the silk mills of Lyon and Piedmont. Upon 
returning from the assignment, he immersed himself in the design of a new automatic silk 
machine. When he tried ‘installing these machines at a new-style silk mill in the Ardèche’, 
however, ‘he soon found that lack of skilled workmen and local resistance… frustrated his 
plans.’ He was prompted then ‘to publish in the proceedings of the Royal Academy of 
Sciences a series of plans of the idealized factories he had constructed: airy, light, 
disciplined, efficient, if ultimately bankrupt.’ (Schaffer 1999, 144) Vaucanson’s work on 
machines thus amplified his vision of machinery to the organisation of work at large. His 
philosophy of machinofacture simultaneously engineered labour as a (mechanized) human 
body and an organisational body of machines: where ‘the automata’, as Schaffer puts it, 
‘were vital for the materialization and evaluation of the laboring body.’ (Schaffer 1999, 
148) 
Vaucanson’s automata operated thus as ‘interfaces’, in the terms in which the then 
nascent discipline of ergonomics took up the word in the 1940s to describe ‘the site at 
which the human body interacts with a complex mechanical apparatus.’ (Harwood 2011, 9) 
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The definition is John Harwood’s, who has recently documented the work that designer and 
architect Eliot Noyes carried out for IBM in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Noyes’ programme, Harwood argues, became definitory of how modern-day corporations 
have come to understand the roles of architecture and design as data-processing machines. 
Noyes’ design consultancy literally engineered into existence a view of architecture, space 
and industrial objects as informational, media and relational flows. Graphics, machine 
casings, curtain and cellular walls, or the layout of table and machine in an operator’s 
control panel should all be understood as environmental interfaces shaping the (corporate) 
person’s capacity for action and understanding. Noyes modelled a corporate culture on the 
image of a computational and cybernetic environment, where informational transactions 
were re-inscribed as social interactions. 
Vaucanson’s defecating duck failed to model the silk plants of Lyon as corporate 
interfaces. The duck, one presumes, cared too much about its bodily functions and not 
enough about its corporate personae. Eighteenth century automata, in other words, were not 
quite media interfaces yet. Where Vaucanson failed, however, IBM and Eliot Noyes 
triumphed. The factory plans and corporate buildings designed by Noyes epitomised the 
turn towards the ‘architecture of information’ that set the stage for the late 1960s 
architectures of experimentation (Galison and Jones 1999). 
The 1960s saw the architecture of information travel to become an experimental 
architecture, in science, art and a variety of cultural settings. Fred Turner has persuasively 
argued how the cybernetic designs and architectural practice of Buckminster Fuller, for 
instance, made its way into the countercultural artistic and political expressions of groups 
such as the Merry Pranksters or the New Communalists (Turner 2006). In particular, it was 
foundational to Stewart Brand’s work at the Whole Earth Catalog, which became the first 
of a series of what Turner calls ‘network forums’ and ‘cultural infrastructures’ (see also 
Turner 2009) where cybernetically-inspired forms of sociality, such as ‘collaboration’, 
‘peer to peer exchanges’ or indeed the ‘hacker ethic’, were naturalised as social innovation 
tout court. Such ‘forums themselves’, writes Turner, ‘often become prototypes of the 
shared understandings around which they are built.’ Here participants ‘celebrated 
entrepreneurial work and heterarchical forms of social organization, promoted disembodied 
community as an achievable ideal, and suggested that techno-social systems could serve as 
sites of ecstatic communion.’ (Turner 2006, 73, emphasis added) Importantly, the forums 
themselves were understood as recursive devices by participants: ‘For Brand, the Whole 
Earth Catalog was simultaneously a whole system in its own right and a tool for its readers 
to use in improving the whole systems that were their lives and the world in which they 
lived.’ (Turner 2006, 82) Social process is therefore re-inscribed as a techno-
communicative and techno-communitarian possibility. No longer simply a model of, nor an 
interface for social relations, the man-machine ‘network’ has now become the prototype for 
sociality itself (Riles 2001). The cultures of prototyping come finally home in their 
‘recompilation’ as prototyping cultures (Kelty 2011). 
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Let me conclude by returning to Copley’s Barber Shop. Copley’s set was meant as a 
sardonic commentary on the composite forms, scales and circuits of art. It held together a 
disparate set of artefacts, images and indices, eliciting (rather than over-determining) 
possible relations between them. It scaled down into a portfolio the repercussions and 
concomitances of an artwork that had scaled-out of itself. It is of course a piece of its time, 
rehearsing the questions and challenges to decentralisation and telecommunication that had 
taken over the art- and science worlds in the early 1970s. It was an exercise, as Manchanda 
has put it, in extricating the prototypical qualities of Picasso’s artwork, doing so by 
pointing out its own status as a prototype – as a suspended agent of possible connections 
and interpretations. For strictly speaking, there is no Barber Shop artwork: it is but a set of 
disparate pieces. More than many and less than one, the Barber Shop is but a 
compossibility. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 As put to by a Daribi friend to Roy Wagner, on the subject of what an 'innovation' in food 
animal rearing may look like (cited in Wagner 1978, 28) 
2 The architecture of experimentation in the second half of the twentieth century mirrors 
such an epistemic transformation in the nature and organisation of scientific and artistic 
work: where factories and industrial laboratories were once designed as placeholders for 
creative work, the late 1960s witnessed a shift in the nature of the experimental as 
‘dispersed social-technical-spatial entities in which meaning is constructed at several 
peripheries, and no single center can hold.’ (Galison and Jones 1999, 527) 
3 On ‘comparison’ vs. ‘compatibility’ (say, in cyborg theory, where relations are made as 
‘partial connections’), see Strathern (2004b) 
4 I owe the coinage to Antonio Lafuente, whose brilliance is a continuous source of 
inspiration. 
5 Debbora Battaglia similarly speaks of prototypes as ‘material arguments for themselves’ 
(Personal communication, February 2012). 
6 Perhaps a mythology for ‘things’ or a mythology for assemblages. At any rate, 
prototyping is its own myth of experimentation: ‘As much an event (like a scientific 
experiment) as it is an explanation… the facility of the myth… is not that of replicating the 
world, but of setting up its own world in contradistinction.’ (Wagner 1978, 33 emphasis 
added)  
